



D espite its still considerable economic andsocial problems, Viet Nam has made
important strides. In less than 12 years, it has
succeeded in raising itself from the bottom of the
World Bank’s list of least developed countries to
the status of “simply” a developing country. 
Some 80% of the Viet Nam’s 80 million citizens
live in rural areas. Economic development,
however, is concentrated in the two main cities,
Ho Chi Ming City in the South and, to a lesser
extent, Ha Noi in the North. This creates
increasingly large and growing disparities of
opportunities, employment, and income. Not
surprisingly, illegal migration from the countryside
to the cities is growing. 
Nevertheless, Viet Nam’s progress is impressive.
GDP per capita increased from US$114 in 1990 to
an estimated $423 in 2002, despite a population
increase of 14 million people. During the same
period, seafood exports rose from $239 million to
$2 billion and rice exports doubled. Viet Nam is
now a leading exporter of rice, coffee, footwear,
and other products. 
None of these developments have happened by
accident. Since 1991, Viet Nam has pursued an
ambitious program of economic reform and
modernization called Doi Moi, or “reconstruction.”
Doi Moi aims to introduce into Viet Nam’s
socialist system some elements of a market-
oriented economy — a “market socialism,” in effect.
Doi Moi has an unusual and distinctive
characteristic: the determination to change the
economic components of the communist system
without changing the political system. Because this
has not been attempted before except in the
People’s Republic of China, there is no roadmap,
no recipe to follow.
André Saumier, who assessed the influence of
research on policy in Viet Nam on behalf of the
International Development Research Centre (IDRC),
notes: “ few in the leadership had much, if any,
even superficial familiarity with either the theory,
the practice, the measurement or the development
and deployment of such policies. Since none of
these could come from within, at least for an initial
period of undetermined length, they had per force
to come from without.” 
IDRC’s presence in Viet Nam
It is in this context that IDRC began supporting
research in Viet Nam in 1991. A study
commissioned by IDRC’s Evaluation Unit in 2002
sought to determine if, to what extent, and by what
means the work it sponsored has had a degree of
policy influence. As André Saumier points out in
his report, “The ‘policy impacts’ one is searching
for here are neither trivial nor marginal. We are
indeed looking at the root and branch re-design of
an economic system; that re-design is unfolding
within the extremely severe constraint of the
continuation in power of a totalitarian Party […].”
Andre Saumier’s report was compiled on the basis
of a literature review and interviews with
Vietnamese researchers and senior government
officials, in particular leaders of advisory and
research bodies. His survey focused on three
IDRC programs.
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT RESEARCH CENTRE
Research and Policy on Parallel Courses
The challenges of measuring the influence of research 
on Viet Nam’s economic policies
Since the early 1990s, Viet Nam has embarked on a radical overhaul of its economic
system. The country aims to open its economy to market forces — but without
changing its socialist political structure. During this same period, IDRC has sponsored
three large research programs in Viet Nam. Have these projects influenced Viet
Nam’s policies?
VISED
In 1993, IDRC and the Canadian International
Development Agency (CIDA) supported a major
effort to increase Viet Nam’s capacity in
environmental economic research through the
Vietnam Sustainable Economic Development
(VISED) program. By its close in 1997, it had
supported 50 relatively small-scale, somewhat
disparate investigations in 25 institutions. It
examined such varied topics as special economic
zones, shareholding companies, credit funds,
and state-owned enterprises. 
IDRC’s counterpart organization was the new
Ministry of Science, Technology, and the
Environment. Although the Ministry was less
involved with economic issues, it had a strong,
well-connected Advisory Group.
VEEM
In 1997, IDRC and CIDA each contributed to VISED’s
successor, the five-year Viet Nam Economic and
Environment Management (VEEM) program, which
built on the past experience in a more tightly
structured manner. VEEM aimed to enhance the
government’s capacity for policy development in
economic integration and natural resource
management, and to conduct policy-oriented
research in those areas. Says André Saumier:
“VEEM had a clear and upfront policy thrust from
day one.” 
VEEM’s economic component focused on only two
interrelated areas: trade liberalization and the
competitiveness of export industries. Five major
reports, published in 2001, were supported by a
comprehensive computerized trade database, the
first and only one of its kind in Viet Nam. 
MIMAP
The Micro Impacts of Macroeconomic and
Adjustment Policies program (1995-2001) had
two somewhat autonomous components: poverty
monitoring and modeling issues. Poverty
alleviation and hunger elimination have for years
been stated policy objectives of the Government
of Viet Nam.
The poverty monitoring component sought to
develop a community-based monitoring system
offering “richer” and quicker data on actual poverty
than large traditional surveys. MIMAP proposed and
tested a methodology calling for bottom-up
measurement on the basis of simple question-
naires administered by local people. Such an
approach ought to lead to social programs better
tailored to the needs of each community. 
The other MIMAP component supported the
development of econometric models capable of
analyzing the broad consequences of various
policy stances or proposals – a first for Viet Nam.
The areas analyzed were the distribution and
equity effects of fiscal policy (that is, VAT rates)
and of trade reform (tariff rates).
Assessing policy influence
Research can influence public policy in different
ways, for example, by expanding policy capacities,
broadening policy horizons, and affecting policy
regimes.
Expanding policy capacities
Research can support the development of
innovative ideas and the skills to communicate
them, and develop new talent for doing issues-
based research and analysis. In other words,
research can improve the institutional framework
surrounding policymaking.
When IDRC started supporting research in Viet
Nam, the policy capacities of Vietnamese institu-
tions and scholars were weak. Because Vietnamese
economists in important policy advisory positions
had studied orthodox Marxist doctrines in Soviet
capitals, they were unacquainted with Western
economic concepts. The kind of economic analysis
required in a market economy is fundamentally
different from that called for in a centrally planned
economy. All economists therefore had to be
retrained in capitalist economic theory and models.
But who would do the retraining, and how?
It is at this level “that the three IDRC programs […]
made an outstanding and singular contribution
through their adoption of an innovative approach
which no one else was using at that time,” writes
Saumier. The approach: to let the Vietnamese
researchers themselves select the issues to be
investigated, to entrust the research to Vietnamese
institutions and researchers, and to provide senior
academic advisors who came periodically to
Ha Noi to advise their colleagues and to review
progress. As well, IDRC encouraged the formation
of inter-institutional networks capable of working
cooperatively. This approach proved extraordinarily
fruitful, and gradually a cadre of competent
researchers emerged.
The effectiveness of that method was evident from
the start, with the VISED program and its varied
small projects. But the scenario holds particularly
for the components of VEEM, which were major
undertakings calling for the gathering and analysis
of large quantities of hard data. The preparation of
the computerized trade database, for example, was
a complex exercise hitherto unheard of among
Vietnamese researchers. 
The scenario applies also to the modeling
component of MIMAP. Here again, Vietnamese
researchers, assisted by outside scholars, carried
out the complex work. Similarly, when the time
came to actually use the model to analyze policy
proposals, the issues were selected by Viet Nam’s
Ministry of Finance. 
Another innovation, encouraged especially by
VEEM and MIMAP, was the creation of teams of
institutions and researchers working together, a
rare collaboration in Viet Nam. The IDRC projects
showed that it was possible to jointly carry out
complicated endeavours requiring a range of skills. 
Broadening policy horizons
Research can introduce new ideas to the policy
agenda, ensure that knowledge is provided to
decision-makers in a form they can use, and
nourish dialogues among researchers and
decision-makers. To put it another way, research
can improve the intellectual framework
surrounding policymaking.
As André Saumier notes, Doi Moi was launched
when the limitations of the communist economic
doctrine became increasingly obvious. Therefore,
he writes, “The initial challenge to policy and
decision-makers was less one of broadening
existing policy horizons than one of exploring a
true ‘terra incognita’ of economic policy and of
finding one’s way around there.” At the beginning
of this process, Viet Nam enjoyed great success:
the country was heralded as the “new tiger”
because of the rapid growth of its economy.
“A certain complacency had taken hold,” notes
Saumier, “based on the view that sufficient reform
had by and large already been implemented, that
success was basically in hand.” But the Asian
financial crisis of 1996-1997 was a brutal wake-up
call. The urgent question then became: how to
restore the momentum? 
As these issues arose after VISED had ended, the
program’s role in broadening policy horizons is
unclear. It is true that most of the projects
supported by VISED did break fresh ground, such as
its contribution to new thinking on regional
development. On the other hand, VISED’s impact on
senior level advisors remains poorly documented.
By contrast, the VEEM program helped the Institute
of Economics address two urgent questions: trade
policy and competitiveness policy. The Institute’s
research showed that the vaunted export orienta-
tion policy of the government was actually one of
import substitution and, in effect, a legacy of the
centrally planned economy. It also showed that the
tariff policy worked to the detriment of rural areas.
In addition, the research revealed that measures to
maintain the competitiveness of the key export
sectors of garments and textiles were based on
flawed analyses. Undoubtedly, such findings had
important policy implications. 
The conclusions reached by the Institute were
shared by other key policy groups, and, as Saumier
points out, these were “in the air” although it is
not possible to fully document the mechanisms
employed for the diffusion of the results to senior
policy levels. But the economic component of VEEM
was managed by three senior government advisors
who could bring those findings to high places.
And as several persons interviewed during this
evaluation argued, the president of the Institute of
Economics played a key role in his capacity as a
member of the Party Central Committee and of the
Standing Committee on Economic Affairs of the
National Assembly.
One of MIMAP’s overt purposes was to broaden
policy horizons, since it proposed a new definition
of poverty and a novel method to document it. “It
is clear,” writes Saumier, “that MIMAP has had an
important impact on the thinking and methodo-
logy of PHERP [the National Program for Hunger
Eradication and Poverty Reduction].”
MIMAP’s modeling component has also had a clear
broadening effect on the taxation side of the
Ministry of Finance. The Ministry’s lack of econo-
metric models was remedied by the development
of a Computable General Equilibrium model with
the assistance of IDRC-provided experts. The
Ministry has since taken “ownership” of this model
and has been using it for many purposes. It is also
continuing to expand it. 
This briefing was prepared by Patrick
Kavanagh and Michelle Hibler based on
a case study written by André Saumier.
Affecting policy regimes
Finally, research can sometimes influence public
policy in a direct way: findings can modify the
development of laws, regulations, programs, or
structures. In actual fact, such a process is rare and
normally circuitous, and only in a few instances
can change be attributed, visibly and directly, to
the inspiration of research alone.
As Saumier argues, because the implementation of
Doi Moi called for a fundamental re-design of
programs and policies and the development of
new ones, “it would certainly not be illegitimate to
argue that the various components of VISED and
VEEM did inevitably affect the Viet Nam policy
regimes, if only by the fact that they expanded the
Government’s policy capacities and broadened its
policy horizons in a context of strong demand for
policy and of very scarce supply thereof.”
Clear paths are difficult to trace, but in the case of
VISED, one can at least observe that many important
policy decisions did conform, ultimately, to the
recommendations of some research. 
VEEM, meanwhile, came to far-reaching conclusions,
but paradoxically had less perceptible direct effect
on policy regimes. Among factors contributing to
this were academic-style reports that were not
operational in policy terms. Also, the reports
became available only in late 2001 and so
insufficient time may have passed for their
influence to be felt. 
MIMAP did not set out to replace current poverty
indicators. However, the government may well
adopt MIMAP’s approach to poverty measurement.
Thus, that program will have enjoyed far-reaching
policy consequences. And its modeling element
has led to interesting theoretical conclusions, for
example concerning the failure of trade
liberalization to “trickle down.”
The International Development Research Centre (IDRC) is a Canadian public corporation, created to help
developing countries find solutions to the social, economic, and natural resource problems they face. Support is
directed to building an indigenous research capacity. Because influencing the policy process is an important
aspect of IDRC’s work, in 2001 the Evaluation Unit launched a strategic evaluation of more than 60 projects in
some 20 countries to examine whether and how the research it supports influences public policy and decision-
making. The evaluation design and studies can be found at: www.idrc.ca/evaluation/policy
Some lessons
❏ All three of IDRC’s programs have had an impact on policy, particularly on the expansion of policy
capacities and the broadening of policy horizons.
❏ Timing contributed strongly to achieving policy influence: Viet Nam was transforming its economic
system and was therefore in need of research to guide its reforms.
❏ In Viet Nam more than in most countries, institutional and personal links were crucial to achieving
influence on policy and measuring this impact later. Strong, well-connected project advisory groups
contributed.
❏ IDRC’s general approach of fostering an indigenous and autonomous research and policy capability
through capacity-building, institutional development, and network creation contributed to its success.
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